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The peak-end memory bias has been well documented for the retrospective evaluation 
of pain. It describes that the retrospective evaluation of pain is largely based on the 
discomfort experienced at the most intense point (peak) and at the end of the episode. 
This is notable because it means that longer episodes with a better ending can 
be remembered as less aversive than shorter ones; this is even if the former had the same 
peak in painfulness and an overall longer duration of pain. Until now, this bias has not 
been studied in the domain of anxiety despite the high relevance of variable levels of 
anxiety in the treatment of anxiety disorders. Therefore, we set out to replicate the original 
studies but with an induction of variable levels of anxiety. Of 64 women, half watched a 
clip from a horror movie which ended at the most frightening moment. The other half 
watched an extended version of this clip with a moderately frightening ending. Afterward, 
all participants were asked to rate the global anxiety which was elicited by the video. 
When the film ended at the most frightening moment, participants retrospectively reported 
more anxiety than participants who watched the extended version. This is the first study 
to document that the peak-end bias can be found in the domain of anxiety. These findings 
require replication and extension to a treatment context to evaluate its implications for 
exposure therapy.
Keywords: anxiety, memory bias, recall bias, peak-end bias, exposure
INTRODUCTION
Several cognitive heuristics and biases have been identified in the past decades. Among the 
most prominent ones are the representativeness and the availability heuristic (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974), and the attention bias (Phillips et  al., 2014). With respect to biases in 
clinical populations, it is evident that efforts have been made to modify them with training 
programs (Beard, 2011). Cognitive bias modification (CBM) aims to lessen cognitive biases 
to treat individuals with alcohol addictions (Eberl et al., 2013), anxiety disorders and depression 
(Hallion and Ruscio, 2011). There are only a few exceptions in which clinical practice has 
aimed at capitalizing on cognitive biases. A notable exception is the peak-end bias.
The peak-end bias describes that retrospective evaluations are often dominated by the average 
discomfort of the worst and the final moments; these are labeled the peak and the end respectively 
(Kahneman et  al., 1993). The peak-end bias has also been referred to as the peak-end rule 
(e.g., Kemp et  al., 2008) or the peak-end effect (e.g., Rode et  al., 2007). The phenomenon is 
closely related to duration neglect (Kahneman et  al., 1993). Duration neglect implies that, in 
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general, the duration of an aversive experience only plays a small 
role in the retrospective evaluation of that experience. Interestingly, 
the peak-end bias can be  utilized as a means to reduce the 
extent of pain that is remembered. It is shown that this bias 
can be  used in medicine to manipulate the subjective level of 
pain that is reported by patients, retrospectively after surgery 
(Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et  al., 2003). This 
is done by prolonging the procedure with a period of less intense 
pain, instead of stopping when the procedure would normally 
be  over. This is sometimes also referred to as “adding a better 
ending” (Kahneman et al., 1993). Remarkably, the longer experience 
is perceived as less painful even though it includes more pain 
in total, but ends with a period of less intense pain.
Kahneman (2011) gives a possible explanation for the 
peak-end bias from an evolutionary perspective, regarding 
which moments are selected for retrospective judgments. 
He  makes a distinction between two selves of humans: “the 
experiencing self ” that does the living and the “remembering 
self ” who keeps score and makes choices. So when he considers 
these two selves in the context of his research on the peak-end 
bias and pain, Kahneman states that “the experiencing self ” 
goes through more pain in total while the “remembering self ” 
judges the longer experience retrospectively as less painful. 
The evaluations made by the “remembering self,” are dominated 
by the most extreme moment of an experience and hence our 
choices are influenced by this. He  argues that this could have 
the function to avoid moments that could potentially elicit 
post-traumatic stress. In line with this argument, Fredrickson 
(2000) suggested that moments of peak affect receive more 
weight in the global evaluation because they convey the personal 
capacity necessary for coping with the experience again. She 
extended the argument to the end moment, because the end 
moment determines the boundaries of the experience and 
thereby defines the peak (Fredrickson, 2000).
Research has shown that the peak-end bias not only influences 
temporary pain, but also the perception of chronic pain (Stone 
et  al., 2000). Other research has indicated that there is also 
a peak-end bias for experiences that differ from pain. This 
includes the perceived unpleasantness of aversive sounds 
(Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000), aversive video clips 
(Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993), impairments of picture 
quality while watching videos (Hands and Avons, 2001), the 
somatic symptom breathlessness (Bogaerts et  al., 2012; 
Walentynowicz et  al., 2015), and mental effort (Finn, 2010; 
Finn and Miele, 2016). This implies that the peak-end bias is 
not limited to experiences of pain.
Another line of research demonstrated that the peak-end 
bias also has an influence on the subjective perception of 
pleasure and enjoyment; food is remembered as more pleasant 
if the more favored component is eaten last compared to when 
it is eaten first (Robinson et  al., 2011). Furthermore, two gifts 
give more pleasure when the better one is given last compared 
to when it is given first (Do et al., 2008), and payment sequences 
(using real payment) with lower end losses are more attractive 
despite a higher total loss (Langer et  al., 2005).
Taken together, the different research-lines support the idea 
that the peak-end bias is not domain specific, but may be  a 
more general phenomenon. Yet, the domains in which it has 
been examined are still limited. We  set out to examine the 
peak-end bias in the domain of anxiety due to the clinical 
significance of implications regarding variable levels of anxiety, 
and for the potential findings relating to the treatment of 
anxiety-related disorders. Eliciting anxiety in a systematic manner 
in the context of exposure is one of the interventions that 
cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders relies on 
most heavily (Craske et  al., 2014). Therefore, investigating the 
peak-end bias in anxiety could be  highly informative for the 
structuring of exposure sessions.
To this end, we  induced anxiety in students by exposing 
them to episodes of a horror movie to examine peak-end 
effects. We  expected that participants in the condition with a 
less intense level of anxiety at the end would report less anxiety 
retrospectively than participants in the condition with the peak 
level of anxiety at the end.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Design
In this study, 64 female students of Radboud University 
participated. They were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (horror movie sequence ending with peak level of 
anxiety/movie sequence ending with moderate level of anxiety). 
Only women were invited to participate in this experiment 
since they are two to three times more likely to be  affected 
by anxiety disorders (Wittchen et  al., 2011). Another reason 
for only inviting woman was that we  wanted to keep the 
sample more homogenous and we  did not plan to investigate 
gender differences in this study. The mean age of the participants 
was 22.06  years (between the ages of 18 and 37  years). Fifty-
four participants were native speakers of Dutch while 10 had 
a different mother tongue.
Materials and Apparatus
In the experiment, we  used an episode of the horror movie The 
Strangers (Bertino and Davison, 2008). The episode predominantly 
consists of uncertain threat. It does not contain any aggressive 
or shocking scenes. The chosen episode was validated beforehand 
in a pilot study1. Based on the plot, the movie episode has a 
peak (high anxiety-eliciting part), which is followed by a part 
that only elicits moderate anxiety. The episode was cut after the 
peak to create two sequences with different endings for the two 
conditions. The condition ending with the peak was 10  min 
and 28  s long and the condition ending with the moderate 
anxiety-eliciting part was 13  min and 28  s long. Furthermore, 
we  used a 15-min clip from the nature documentary OCEANS 
(Perrin, 2009) and a 2-min clip from the comedy film Despicable 
1 An independent sample of 41 female students participated in the pilot study. 
Statistical analysis of the heart rate confirmed that the heart rate increased 
during exposure to the complete movie sequence compared to a baseline 
measurement. We  found that the sequence continuously elicited a significantly 
higher heart rate compared to the baseline measurement. We  did not collect 
self-reported anxiety ratings or a state anxiety questionnaire in the pilot study.
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Me (Meledandri and Coffin, 2010). The presentation of the 
experiment and registration of responses were controlled in the 
Inquisit software package (Millisecond Software, Seattle, USA).
State anxiety was measured via the short-form of the state 
scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) 
(Marteau and Bekker, 1992). This questionnaire consists of six 
statements that are answered on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0  =  “absolutely not” to 4  =  “very much.” One example 
is: “I feel calm.” General interest in horror movies was measured 
with one question: “How much do you  like horror movies in 
general?” Answers are given on a 5-point Likert scale from 
0 = “not at all” to 5  =  “very much.” To measure trait anxiety, 
the trait scale of the STAI (Spielberger et  al., 1970) was 
administered, and a quick Big Five questionnaire was used to 
measure personality (Vermulst and Gerris, 2005). The quick 
Big Five questionnaire measures personality based on the five-
factor model of personality (Goldberg, 1993). The questionnaire 
consists of a list of 30 adjectives about general personality traits. 
The questionnaire asks how much a person thinks that these 
traits apply to them. Answers are given on a 7-point Likert 
scale from 0  =  “not at all” to 7 “very much.” The five subscales 
extraversion (α = 0.85), agreeableness, (α = 0.75), conscientiousness 
(α  =  0.87), neuroticism (α  =  0.83), and openness to experience 
(α  =  0.76) are measured with six items each.
Procedure
The procedure was reviewed and approved by the ethics committee 
for social sciences (ECSW) at Radboud University in Nijmegen. 
First, informed written consent was obtained from all participants 
by the experimenter. After this, the experimenter left the room 
for the rest of the experiment. The presentation of the experiment 
and registration of given responses were controlled by the Inquisit 
software package (Millisecond Software, Seattle, USA). Then, 
participants were exposed to the horror movie sequences of The 
Strangers (Bertino and Davison, 2008) presented on a computer 
screen in a dark room. The original sound was played over 
speakers. In one condition, participants were exposed to the 
sequence ending with the peak and in the other condition to 
the extended sequence ending with the moderate frightening 
ending. Apart from this difference in conditions, the procedure 
was the same for all participants. Directly after watching the 
sequences, the participants filled in the state anxiety questionnaire 
(Marteau and Bekker, 1992) to check for a difference in anxiety 
levels between the conditions.
Next, they were asked if they were familiar with the movie, 
about their general interest in horror movies, and their 
demographics. General interest in horror movies may have 
had an impact on their reaction to the clip they viewed (Hoffner 
and Levine, 2005). Afterward, the participants filled in the 
trait anxiety questionnaire (Spielberger et  al., 1970) and the 
quick Big Five (Vermulst and Gerris, 2005), which were included 
to check for group differences.
Subsequently, the episode of the nature documentary OCEANS 
(Perrin, 2009) was shown to the participants as a filler task 
to eliminate possible priming effects; this episode was not 
expected to elicit significant emotions. Priming could otherwise 
be  elicited because of the different endings of the movie 
sequences. More precisely, participants in the condition with 
the peak at the end could indicate that they perceived the 
movie sequence as more frightening solely due to the recency 
of their experience of the end moments compared to those 
participants in the condition with the moderate end. This 
principle is similar to the peak-end bias; however, the fundamental 
difference is that priming effects are considered to be influential 
for only a relatively short period of time. The literature states 
that media priming does not have an effect beyond durations 
longer than 20  min after the prime (Roskos-Ewoldsen et  al., 
2002). In contrast, studies on the effects of the peak-end bias 
on pain have shown that these effects are robust, even up to 
time periods of 1  year (Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996). By 
presenting the documentary, we  made sure that there were at 
least 20  min (trait anxiety questionnaire, quick Big Five, and 
documentary) between the manipulation and the retrospective 
assessment of how frightening the participants perceived the 
movie sequences.
After the filler task, the participants were asked how frightening 
they thought the movie sequence was, on a 100-point scale 
ranging from 0  =  “absolutely not” to 100  =  “very much.” 
Using a one-item measure for the global retrospective evaluation 
is common practice in research on the peak-end effect (e.g., 
Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000; Rode et al., 2007; Kemp et al., 
2008; Robinson et al., 2011). Finally, the episode of the comedy 
film Despicable Me (Meledandri and Coffin, 2010) was presented 
to the participants to counter the induced anxiety and ensure 
the participants left the experiment in a better mood.
Data Preparation
Eight participants were familiar with the movie The Strangers 
(Bertino and Davison, 2008), but did not score significantly 
different from the other participants, neither on the state anxiety 
questionnaire nor on how frightening they thought the sequences 
were (analyses are not reported here). Therefore, we  included 
them in the analyses to sustain more statistical power to 
detect effects.
Data Analysis2
To check whether the sequences evoked different levels of anxiety 
at the end in the two conditions, an ANOVA was conducted. 
We  used the mean scores per condition (peak ending/moderate 
ending) on the state anxiety questionnaire (Marteau and Bekker, 
1992) administered immediately after the sequences.
To test whether participants in the condition with a less intense 
level of anxiety at the end would report less anxiety retrospectively 
than participants in the condition with a more intense 
level of anxiety at the end, a second ANOVA was conducted. 
We  used the mean scores per condition (peak ending/moderate 
ending) from the question concerning how frightening the movie 
sequence was, 20  min after they had seen it.
2 Some of the dependent variables are not normally distributed and have outliers; 
therefore, the analyses were also conducted without outliers and on transformed 
data to account for violations of assumptions. Since this did not substantially 
change any of the results, we  report the analyses and show graphs of the 
original data.
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In addition, to exclude the possibility of significant group 
differences between the conditions, a MANOVA was conducted, 
with the mean scores per condition (peak ending/moderate 
ending) on the trait anxiety questionnaire (Spielberger et  al., 
1970), the question about enjoyment of horror movies in 
general and on the dimensions of the personality questionnaire 
(Vermulst and Gerris, 2005).
To control for individual differences regarding the trait 
anxiety of the participants, we  ran an ANCOVA with the 
mean score per condition (peak ending/moderate ending) on 
the state anxiety questionnaire and as a covariate, the scores 
on the trait anxiety questionnaire.
Furthermore, we  ran an ANCOVA with the mean scores 
per condition on the question how frightening the movie 
sequence was retrospectively and as a covariate, the scores on 
the trait anxiety questionnaire.
To explore the influence of individual differences in the 
preference of horror movies, we ran an ANCOVA with the mean 
scores per condition (peak ending/moderate ending) on the state 
anxiety questionnaire and as a covariate, the scores on the question 
regarding how much participants liked horror movies in general.
Moreover, we controlled for the effect of how much participants 
liked horror movies in general on the effect between conditions 
of how frightening the participants thought the horror movie 
sequence had been 20  min after they saw it. Therefore, we  ran 
an ANCOVA with the mean scores per condition (peak ending/
moderate ending) on the retrospective recall of the levels of 
anxiety evoked by the horror movie sequences and as covariate 
the scores on the question regarding how much participants 
liked horror movies in general.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
As intended, the participants who had been exposed to the 
sequence ending with the peak were more anxious directly after 
watching the sequence (M = 17.7, SD = 2.60) than the participants 
who were exposed to the sequence with the moderate ending 
(M  =  15.5, SD  =  3.64); F(1,62)  =  8.30, p  =  0.005; η2  =  0.118. 
This effect was in the medium range. See also Figure 1.
Control for Group Differences
We did not find any significant differences between the conditions 
(peak ending/moderate ending) on the trait anxiety questionnaire, 
on any of the five dimensions of the personality questionnaire 
and on enjoyment of horror movies in general; F(7, 56) = 1.67, 
p  =  0.135. See also Table 1.
Peak-End Bias
After watching the filler, the retrospective recall of the levels of 
anxiety evoked by the horror movie sequences differed between 
the conditions. In line with our hypothesis, participants who 
had been exposed to the sequence ending with the peak 
retrospectively reported that they thought the sequence was more 
frightening (M  =  85.5, SD  =  11.98) than the participants who 
had been exposed to the sequence with the moderate ending 
(M  =  74.69, SD  =  21.30); F(1, 62)  =  6.26, p  =  0.015; η2  =  0.092. 
This effect was in the medium range. See also Figure 1.
Control for Individual Differences
Trait anxiety was not a significant covariate in how much anxiety 
the participants reported directly after watching the horror movie 
sequence in the two conditions; F(1, 61)  =  2.70, p  =  0.105; 
trait anxiety did not influence the effect of the different movie 
sequences on state anxiety at the end of the sequences; F(1, 
61)  =  6.09, p  =  0.016; η2  =  0.091. Furthermore, trait anxiety 
was not a significant covariate for the retrospective recall of 
the level of anxiety elicited by the horror movie sequences; 
F(1, 61)  =  1.03, p  =  0.314; including trait anxiety as covariate 
did not alter the found peak-end effects; F(1, 61)  =  4.85, 
p  =  0.031; η2  =  0.074.
Enjoyment of horror movies in general was negatively related 
to how anxious the participants were directly after watching 
FIGURE 1 | Left panel: Sinaplot (Sidiropoulos et al., 2017) showing the original data (see text footnote 2), means and confidence intervals of the reported state 
anxiety directly after the horror movie sequences separately for the condition with the moderate end and the condition ending with the peak. Right panel: Sinaplot 
showing the original data (see text footnote 2), means and confidence intervals of the reported retrospective anxiety 20 min after the presentation of the horror movie 
sequences separately for the condition with the moderate end and the condition ending with the peak.
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the horror movie sequence; F(1, 61)  =  10.68, p  =  0.002; 
η2  =  0.149; this effect was strong. Nonetheless, controlling for 
the enjoyment of horror movies in general did not significantly 
impact the effect of the different movie sequences on the state 
anxiety at the end of the sequences; F(1, 61) = 6.52, p = 0.013; 
η2 = 0.097. Enjoyment of horror movies in general was negatively 
related to the retrospective recall of the level of anxiety elicited 
by the horror movie sequences; F(1, 61)  =  15.39, p  <  0.001; 
η2  =  0.201; this effect was strong. However, controlling for 
the enjoyment of horror movies in general did not significantly 
affect the effect of the different movie sequences on the 
retrospective recall of the level of anxiety; F(1, 61)  =  4.56, 
p  =  0.037; η2  =  0.070.
DISCUSSION
This is the first study to examine the peak-end bias in the 
domain of anxiety. It clearly demonstrates that in retrospect, 
a frightening experience is rated as less frightening if it does 
not end with the most poignant moment. The experience is 
rated less frightening although it has the same peak and an 
additional anxiety-eliciting component, thereby including more 
anxiety in total. This is paradoxical because a more objective 
evaluation would result in the opposite judgment.
In the experiment, we  found peak-end effects in students 
watching the movie sequences. Earlier research has shown that 
the peak-end bias applies to a range of retrospective judgments 
about acute pain (Kahneman et  al., 1993), chronic pain (Stone 
et  al., 2000), aversive picture quality (Hands and Avons, 2001), 
aversive sounds (Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000), and pleasure 
and enjoyment (Langer et  al., 2005; Do et  al., 2008; Robinson 
et  al., 2011). The hypothesis, based on the earlier research, 
was that the peak-end bias is a universal phenomenon of 
retrospective evaluations and therefore also applies to anxiety. 
More specifically, we expected that participants in the condition 
with a less intense level of anxiety at the end would report 
less anxiety retrospectively than those participants in the 
condition with the peak level of anxiety at the end. This 
hypothesis was confirmed.
The state anxiety questionnaire (Marteau and Bekker, 1992) 
confirmed the different intensities of anxiety between the 
conditions directly after the exposure to the sequences. It was 
also ascertained through multiple filler tasks that at least 20 min 
passed between the manipulation and the assessment of the 
retrospective anxiety. This was to ensure that the results could 
not be compromised by priming effects (e.g., Roskos-Ewoldsen 
et al., 2002). Thereby, the peak-end effect can clearly be attributed 
to the difference in the conditions.
Our research confirms that the peak-end bias can also 
be observed in the domain of anxiety; this supports the notion 
that the peak-end effect is not domain specific but a general 
phenomenon of human retrospective evaluations.
Considering individual differences, we found that trait anxiety 
of the participants did not affect the found peak-end effects. 
Regarding the anxiety induction by means of horror movie 
sequences, we found that participants that enjoy horror movies 
in general were less anxious at the end of the horror movie 
sequences. In line with this finding, peak-end effects were 
stronger in participants that do not enjoy horror movies in 
general. This is an artifact of the used anxiety induction. For 
persons that enjoy horror movies, anxiety in the context of 
horror movies has not a clear positive or negative valence. 
They might enjoy being anxious in this context.
However, this study has certain limitations. Some of them 
originate from our decision to follow the original peak-end 
paradigm as closely as possible which we  adopted to the 
domain of anxiety for the first time. First, there is only a 
single item for the global retrospective evaluation. This might 
limit psychometric quality, but such a measure was successful 
in detecting the effects of the manipulation in previous 
research on the peak-end bias (e.g., Schreiber and Kahneman, 
2000; Rode et  al., 2007; Kemp et  al., 2008; Robinson et  al., 
2011) and it was sensitive in the present study. Second, the 
movie sequences differed in length; the sequence with the 
less frightening ending was somewhat longer. However, this 
again is common in research on the peak-end bias (e.g., 
Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et  al., 2003). 
Importantly, other research shows that the peak-end effect 
also holds for experiences of equal duration (e.g., Stone et al., 
2000; Hands and Avons, 2001). In one aspect, we  deviated 
from the original paradigm. We  did not continuously collect 
ratings of anxiety during the presentation of the sequences. 
We did not do so because this could distract from the movie 
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations and MANOVA comparisons for the questionnaires scores of the two conditions (peak anxiety at the end of the sequence  
n = 32, moderate anxiety at the end of the sequence n = 32).
Questionnaire Peak ending Moderate ending MANOVA
M (SD) M (SD) F df p
STAI-T 40.41 (9.88) 35.78 (10.12) 3.42 62 0.069
N 23.75 (6.17) 24.03 (6.75) 0.03 62 0.862
E 24.47 (5.95) 25.06 (6.32) 0.15 62 0.700
O 28.53 (6.02) 29.50 (5.54) 0.45 62 0.506
C 29.28 (6.65) 26.50 (6.70) 2.78 62 0.101
A 34.59 (3.28) 24.37 (3.19) 0.07 62 0.788
Enjoyment 1.56 (0.91) 1.88 (1.10) 1.53 62 0.221
STAI-T, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait form (Spielberger et al., 1970); N, Neuroticism; E, Extraversion; O, Openness to experience; C, Conscientiousness; A, agreeableness (quick 
Big Five questionnaire, Vermulst and Gerris, 2005); Enjoyment: Question about enjoyment of horror movies in general.
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sequence and distraction could impede the induction of 
anxiety (Foa and Kozak, 1986). Nonetheless, we  validated 
the sequence beforehand in a pilot study1 with continuous 
heart rate measurements in a separate sample.
More specifically, a horror movie might not be the optimal 
way to induce anxiety in the context of the peak-end bias 
for two reasons. First, horror movies might have a different 
valence for different participants; some may enjoy the thrill. 
However, the presentation of such movies is well established 
in the literature and it is one of the most common and 
effective methods of emotion elicitation; it is generally 
thought to be valid to induce anxiety (Schaefer et  al., 2010). 
Also, our results demonstrate that controlling for general 
enjoyment of horror movies does not significantly impact 
the peak-end bias we  found. Second, in contrast to the 
manipulations used in the studies on pain, the movie clips 
contain a plot. The plot consists of a specific threat that 
varied in intensity over time but was continuously present 
and never resolved. It is difficult to rule out that the additional 
information provided in the longer sequence resulted in 
reappraisal of the content of the shorter one. In any case, 
such a perspective does not argue against the existence of 
the peak-end bias in anxiety. Instead, it might reflect on 
its underlying mechanism.
Furthermore, as in all research with university students, 
the sample might not be  representative. On the one hand, 
we  tested only women in this experiment since they are two 
to three times more likely to be  affected by anxiety disorders 
(Wittchen et al., 2011) and to keep the sample more homogenous. 
On the other hand, for ethical reasons, participants were 
informed that highly emotional material would be  shown to 
them during the experiment, which might have led to self-
selection bias in participation. These participants may be more 
emotionally stable than the general population (Almeida et al., 
2008). However, we  did not find any indication for a floor 
effect in the trait anxiety measure. On the other hand, the 
peak-end bias we  found may be  a conservative account; it 
may be  considerably stronger in patients with anxiety-
related psychopathology.
To address the limitations of the study, we  suggest that 
future studies use a manipulation to elicit fear which does 
not have ambiguous valence and does not have a plot. Anxiety 
could be elicited in a (clinical) sample that is afraid of certain 
stimuli by exposing participants to their fear, for example 
fear of heights (e.g., Davis et  al., 2011) or fear of spiders 
(e.g., Gerdes et  al., 2009). Furthermore, such a preselection 
based on specific fears could also eliminate the possibility 
self-selection bias in participation. In addition, given the 
differences in prevalence of anxiety disorders between men 
and woman, future studies should also investigate potential 
gender differences in the context of the peak-end bias 
in anxiety.
It is an open question whether a less aversive retrospective 
memory of anxiety is predictive of future behavior as it was 
demonstrated in the domain of pain (Kahneman et  al., 1993). 
This would be  especially interesting for clinical practice in the 
context of avoidance behavior and dropout rates which are 
common in anxiety disorders. Future research should investigate 
the peak-end bias in a clinical population. One of the most 
effective treatments for anxiety-related disorders is exposure 
therapy (Powers et  al., 2010; Ougrin, 2011), in which patients 
are exposed to the objects of their pathological fears. Studying 
the peak-end memory bias in this context could be  highly 
informative for clinicians and for the design of exposure therapy. 
Anxiety typically peaks in the beginning of exposure and wanes 
within and across sessions (Alpers et  al., 2005; Alpers and 
Sell, 2008). The exposure itself is often thought to require a 
noticeable reduction of anxiety to be effective (Foa and Kozak, 
1986; Alpers, 2010; Gloster et  al., 2011); however, other 
researchers have stated that this is not necessary (Craske et al., 
2014). In any case, the aversive memory of anxiety experienced 
during exposure may be  less aversive if exposure lasted until 
anxiety waned.
Given the required replication of our results in a clinical 
sample, we  recommend to devote special attention to the 
structuring of exposure therapy in order to facilitate a 
noticeable anxiety reduction toward the end (compared to 
the peak anxiety) within one exposure session. Even if the 
literature is not entirely conclusive on whether such fear 
reduction is necessary for the effectiveness of exposure, it 
may nonetheless render the patient’s memory of the experience 
as less aversive. Another desirable effect may be  that fewer 
patients may drop out because a less aversive memory could 
reduce avoidance behavior of similar experiences. Better 
understanding of this bias may help to reduce dropout rates 
which are a common problem in exposure-based treatments 
(e.g., Belleau et  al., 2017).
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